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1. Why economics needs to predict 
 
The financial crisis that hit high-income economies in 2008 has had a depressive 
economic impact around the globe, which has been compared to the recession of the 
1930s. It is damaging many people’s well-being in terms of growing unemployment 
and increasing insecurity for those fortunate enough to keep their employment. In 
2010, there were 27.6 million more unemployed people in the world as compared 
with 2007. Similarly, the numbers of people in vulnerable employment have been 
rising (ILO, 2011: 6ff). Comparative analysis of financial crises since the mid-1990s 
(van der Hoeven, 2011) and current projections for these indicators for 2011 (ILO, 
2011) give reason to fear that the human costs of the crisis will continue to be high.  
 
Despite the use of sophisticated forecasting models, neo-classical economics did not 
foresee a crisis of this global scale. The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) 
annual “World Economic Outlook” is widely quoted as a source for analyses and 
predictions of the global economic climate. It is prepared by the Fund’s large crew of 
economists, trained chiefly in the neo-classical tradition. In the outlook’s April 2007 
edition, one and a half year before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers became the 
starting signal of the so-far deepest and broadest financial and economic crisis ever, 
the difficulties in the US housing sector were being acknowledged, but “the baseline 
view remains that difficulties in the housing sector will not have major spill-overs, 
provided that employment and income growth remain resilient.” (IMF, 2007: 7f).  
 
Though the US housing sector faced problems, this was in a period of rapid global 
economic growth and the US-specificity of the phenomenon encouraged the view that 
developments in the USA would ‘decouple’ from the global economy (IMF, 2007: 
xvi). The widely predicted 2008 annual GNP growth rate for the USA stood at 2.8 per 
cent, compared to an actual increase of 0.4 per cent in 2008 and a slump of -2.4 per 
cent in 2009 (IMF, 2010). But, focusing on empirical data on the US housing market, 
forecasts missed the deeper structural processes taking place in the financial sector 
that would spread the crisis globally. 
 
The response to the global financial crisis has been characterised by an unusual 
degree of self-criticism of the economists profession for not foreseeing this shock 
(e.g. Krugman, 2009, Colander et al., 2009). This was despite prediction being 
claimed to be the main objective of the discipline by Milton Friedman, the Nobel 
Laureate and doyen of neo-classical economics in 1953. In an essay that has been 
called the most influential work on economic methodology in the 20th century, 
Friedman defined the aim of ‘positive’ – in contrast to normative - economics as ‘to 
provide a system of generalisations that can be used to make correct predictions about 
the consequences of any change in circumstances’ (Friedman, 1953: 181). 
 
In this paper, we show how the anchoring of methodologies associated with neo-
classical economics in a logical positivist epistemology has prevented economists 
from detecting cusps in the economy. With neo-classical economics, we refer to a 
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narrow understanding of the discipline that emerged in the late 19th century in the 
work of Jevons, Menger and Walras associated with mathematisation of economics. 
The related economic policy advice centres on the advocacy of letting competitive 
market forces allocate resources. We argue that, while the depression of the 1930s had 
led to an overhaul of discipline’s theoretical foundations, giving way to Keynes’ 
acknowledgement of the persistence of market disequilibria, the financial crises of the 
past 20 years ought to initiate a questioning of the epistemological foundations of the 
discipline. As an alternative, we offer our interpretation of a critical realist 
underpinning for a political economy focused on the specific instabilities of 
contemporary global capitalism. 
 
 
2. The logical positivist roots of neo-classical economics 
 
Economics has aspired to the status of a predictive science since Adam Smith claimed 
to have discovered laws in the operation of markets (e.g. Hirshleifer, 1985, Sebba, 
1953). The ‘invisible hand’ of market forces can be seen as having an epistemological 
equivalence to Isaac Newton’s force of gravity (e.g. Redman, 1993), including its 
ability to bring ‘bodies’ into interaction at a distance with no physical links. The 
desire to emulate ‘natural sciences’ epistemology was understandable as puzzle after 
puzzle appeared to be solved in physics using a combination of deductive logic and 
careful observation. 
 
Karl Popper modified our understanding of the success of physics as knowledge and 
extended his epistemology of science in the physical world to knowledge of human 
phenomena. Proposing falsification as the ‘solution’ to the induction problem in 
knowing the physical world, Popper suggested that all human knowledge was 
provisional (Popper, 1972). His starting point was the asymmetry between 
verification and falsification: While nothing can ever be exhaustively empirically 
verified – the ‘problem of induction’ had been recognised since Hume in the 18th 
century -, a single empirical falsification suffices to disprove an empirically testable 
statement (Blaug, 1994: 111). According to Popper, this falsification criterion 
distinguishes science from non-science (Blaug, 1994: 109f, Boland, 1994: 155). He 
laid down conventions to prevent scientists from safeguarding refuted theories. Their 
main idea is that refuted theories may be amended to avoid future falsifications, but 
only if they increase the empirical content of the theory and hence render it more 
testable (Blaug, 1994: 111).  
 
Other epistemological virtues were added to complete a logical positivist 
epistemological paradigm. The emphasis on deductive work suggested there was a 
virtue in reducing the ontological weight of assumptions from which the deductive 
work proceeded. Therefore, the parsimony of Occam’s razor was attractive in 
epistemologically ranking theories making the same prediction with fewer 
assumptions above those with more assumptions. One valued quality of these 
assumptions was mathematical tractability to facilitate rigorous deduction. 
 
The emphasis on falsification and deductive work (and the academic prestige that 
went with it) had implications for the epistemological virtues of observation.  
Deductive work became scientific when it resulted in falsifiable predictions of 
observable relationships that seemed to reveal natural laws. Therefore, 
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3. Why neo-classical economics fails to predict 
 
The translation of the logical positivist epistemology outlined above into neo-classical 
economics has had profound, if complex, methodological consequences. They include 
an emphasis on falsification as a key criterion for assessing the quality of knowledge, 
translated into quantified research procedures, thin models of human agency and 
collective economic behaviour as well as the exogenisation of dramatic change 
outside the economic domain. Together, these methodological implications over-
determine an inability to predict cusps and their associated crises. 
 
In neo-classical economics, stochastic hypothesis testing has become the 
methodological corollary of falsification tests in Popperian science. To paraphrase 
Einstein, ‘in neo-classical economics, god does play dice’. While it does not require a 
quantitative approach, applied economics research commonly employs analytical 
statistics of historical quantitative data for hypothesis testing. Generalisation in 
economics became associated with statistical significance tests on random samples 
from well specified populations. The significance of coefficients is used as an 
indicator of whether models are supported or rejected by empirical data (McCloskey 
and Ziliak, 1996).  
 
Stochastic testing resists unambiguous falsification and can permit theories to persist 
merely because they have not been falsified, rather than because they give insights 
into actual events. The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models 
widely used by Central Banks for macro-economic forecasting are cases in point. 
They have been criticised for being too simplistic (Colander et al., 2008). Even 
researchers at the Bank for International Settlements have pointed out that one of the 
major limitations of DSGE models is their weakness in modelling financial markets 
(Tovar, 2009: 6ff). Neither this critique nor their failure to predict the crisis has led to 
their abandonment. 
 
As an important side effect, the quantitative or quantifiable information that is 
required for econometric testing, converts information about structures and 
institutions in an economy to categorical, ‘dummy’ or ‘proxy’ variables. Complex 
regulation of financial markets, albeit important in influencing the behaviour of 
economic actors, is difficult to translate into a parameter of general equilibrium 
models, though. Hence, the aim of identifying generalisable laws and the use of 
historical, numerical data combine to produce a tendency to predictions emphasising 
extrapolation from stable ‘structural’ relationships, constraining the capacity to 
foresee discrete changes. 
 
Models of human agency in its economic dimension realm are commonly based on 
the assumption of individual choice at the margin, underpinned by an axiomatic 
economic rationality (Bardhan and Ray, 2006) that reduces the future to a calculation 
of expected values and rational expectations. This ontological, atomistic status given 
to the ‘axiomatically rational individual’ in mainstream neo-classical economics owes 
its origins to a complex mix of ‘modernist’ liberal ideology and mathematical 
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tractability. But a possible model of Nietzschean ‘heroic’ human agency in which 
individuals exercise full self-determination is constrained to only allow individual 
choices at the margin in response to gradual movements in the vector of all prices. 
Such a ‘thin theory of human action’ (Taylor, 1988) is assumed to give economic 
models their precision, parsimony and predictive power, criteria very much in line 
with Popperian thinking. Changes due to technological innovation are treated as 
gradually disseminating and absorbable at the margin in decision-making. Large 
unanticipated challenges would destroy the generalisable patterns that are the 
objective of Friedmannian scientific inquiry, and are therefore being missed out in 
this approach (Rattagia, 2010: 29). 
 
Besides the thin conceptualisation of human agency underlying neo-classical 
economics, methodological individualism also implies that macro-events are largely 
perceived as being (caused by) aggregates of individual actions with limited 
interactive variables. The structure of general equilibrium mathematical economic 
models allows to take into account large numbers of prices, commodities, and – last 
but not least – agents (Debreu, 1991). In case of the DSGE models, this assumes 
away, for instance, any agent coordination problems or emergent macro properties. 
Colander et al. (2008: 236) conclude that “Since in a complex system aggregate 
behavior cannot be deduced from an analysis of individuals alone, representative 
agent models fail to address the most basic questions of macroeconomics.” 
 
This implies the inability to foresee the consequences of non-marginal changes, such 
as rapid, apparently unconstrained changes in asset values that render ‘negative 
feedback’ predictive models based on rational expectations and expected values 
redundant. Tendencies to emphasising equilibrium, comparative static approaches to 
change, and positivist quantified empiricism are emergent phenomena from this 
epistemological and methodological framing that can also contribute to failure to 
predict crisis.  
 
Friedman’s distinction between the realms of positive and normative economics, with 
the latter being an arena for politicians rather than for serious economists, parallels 
Popper’s distinction between science and non-science. It has led to an exogenisation 
of dramatic change outside the economic domain, reflected, for instance, in the 
explanation that politicians ‘caused’ the problems by irresponsible fiscal policies 
and/or ‘rescuing’ banks that ’should’ have been allowed to fail. Yet, the neo-classical 
assumption of equilibrating force of markets actually leads to a strong normative 
position of minimising extra-economic interference and a demand for less regulation. 
 
But how do these methodological principles obstruct prediction? The answer is subtle, 
it appears that logical positivism places an emphasis on abstract logical reasoning 
which should free up thinking about possible futures. But the demand that the logical 
process leads to falsifiable predictions tested against already existing data means that 
claims to new knowledge are inevitably backward looking. Thus predictions about the 
future are mere extensions of the past consistent with the deep ontological belief that 
the past and the future are fundamentally similar reflecting the same equilibrating 
processes. In the physical sciences, the assumption of fundamental symmetry between 
the past and the future with both governed by the same natural laws has not proved 
problematic, but predicting movements in the human condition may require an 




4. The critical realist alternative in making predictions 
 
As an alternative to this epistemological/methodological nexus, we offer our 
interpretation of a critical realist underpinning for a political economy focused on the 
specific instabilities of contemporary global capitalism. Critical realism 
conceptualises reality as open and layered. It assumes openness in the sense that the 
social world is characterised by relations and dependencies between people and 
institutions as well as by the possibility for internal change (Lawson, 1997: 77ff). 
Bhaskar (2008: 46ff) distinguishes the ‘real’ level of reality from the ‘actual’ and the 
‘empirical’. While the real refers to causal structures and generative mechanisms, it 
generates events at the actual level, which are apprehended as experiences in the 
domain of the empirical. Epistemologically, this implies that the aim of social science 
cannot go beyond the identification of event demi-regularities in empirical data, 
embedded and caused in the specific ‘real’ social and historical settings (Lawson, 
1997: 204f). As causal powers are located at the level of the real, a more appropriate 
causal analysis takes into account theoretical knowledge of underlying structures and 
the historical analysis of the particular circumstances in which they exist (Bhaskar, 
1986: 108). This logic of inference espoused by critical realism has been termed 
‘retroduction’ (Danermark et al., 2002: 96ff). 
 
In constructing an alternative, we return to the limitations of neo-classical economics 
methodology described above and systematically modify them in a critical realist 
direction. 
 
a. Less emphasis on falsification as a key criterion for assessing quality of knowledge 
 
b. More space for non-quantified reflections on relationships 
 
c. Thicker model of human agency, including bounded rationality and uncertainty 
 
d. Well-specified model of collective human economic behaviour 
 
e. Endogenise the possibility of dramatic change within the economic domain 
 
Using this antithetical framework, we suggest that an economics methodology 
informed by a critical realist epistemology would increase the probability of a timely 
prediction of crises. 
 
a. Critical realism values structural explanation (retroduction) in place of hypothesis 
testing at the, often superficial, empirical level. Starting from an ontological position 
that reality is layered, going beyond observable, atomistic data, knowledge should be 
assessed in terms of its claims to integrate all human experience into a single, 
complex framework, including the potential for multi-dimensional, integrated crisis 
 
b. The search for generalisable economic laws through falsification presumes event 
regularities. This assumption has been criticised by critical realists as imposing an 
unrealistic external closure on a reality that is essentially open (Lawson, 1997: 77ff, 
Sayer, 1992: 182ff). Moreover, because the observation of events does not enable the 
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identification of their causes due to the disjuncture between real structures, the actual 
events produced and the restricted range of events that is available to experience 
(Gruffydd Jones, 2001: 3), critical realist contributions have criticised analytical 
statistics alone as inappropriate for the explanation of social phenomena. De-
prioritising quantitative data reduces the temptation to extrapolate and impose path 
dependence. Mixed-methods triangulation, in contrast, has been identified as a 
manifestation of retroduction that allows a logically consistent approach to economic 
analysis (Downward and Mearman, 2007: 96). 
 
c. Critical realists have criticised the intrinsic closure of economic models, assuming 
an automatic transmission of a set of boundary conditions or events into another 
measureable event mediated by the abovementioned ‘thin’ model of human agency. 
The critical realist emphasis on openness lends itself to a more ethnographic, life-
world approach to human identity and decision-making rather than models of 
representative agents derived from introspection rather than from empirical evidence.  
 
d. A broader approach to human decision-making may travel beyond individuals as 
decision-making unit. Taking a critical realist perspective, Andrikopoulos (2011: 15) 
emphasises that the ‘social nature of financial markets’ due to participants’ practices 
and conventions, their structured relations as well as the fact that financial markets are 
constitutive parts of the society’s culture exclude the possibility of closure and 
constant regularities. While much data at the empirical level is collected from 
individuals (people or firms), the actual and structural levels of critical realism create 
room for creating analytical collectivities, such as classes and fractions of capital. 
Many critical realist contributions claim that reality is dialectical and in a perpetual 
state of change caused by unresolved structural tensions. In contrast to a theoretical 
emphasis on the equilibrating forces of markets, this awareness of tension increases 
the possibility of foreseeing crises. 
 
e. The openness of reality that is an ontological and epistemological point of 
departure for critical realists implies that there are no clear boundaries between 
economics and politics. In critical realism, changes in structural processes in any field 
can spread throughout a system changing all other fields. Structural changes in the 
economic field can induce emergent changes in the political field at the actual level. 
Lawson (2009: 774) summarises that “At all points in, and stages of development of, 
the ﬁnancial system, we are faced not with a ubiquity of regular behavioural patterns 
underpinned by isolated systems of human atoms, but with the perpetual emergence 
of novelty, not least at the level of relational structures, underpinning transformed 
mechanisms and practices.” Therefore, decisions in formal politics are likely to be de 
facto shifting responsibility for crisis from economic structural processes to the 
political field at the actual level 
 
 
5. Applying critical realist principles to the current crisis 
 
In the realm of financial markets, the domain of the empirical may refer to data on 
asset prices, while the actual would address the event of asset pricing, triggered by the 
real structures of regulation and financial market actors’ strategies. In contrast to the 
causality established between data in the empirical domain that characterises logical 
positivism – ‘event regularities’ in critical realist parlance – critical realism aims at 
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explanation that takes the causal powers of the real level as a starting point and aims 
at an identification of how they work and under what conditions (Sayer, 1992: 14). 
 
Andrikopoulos (2011: 26f) argues that “[a]n alternative approach can assume open 
systems that conform with the absence of constant regularities in observed instances 
of market operation, such as asset prices, leverage ratios or credit ratings. In such an 
approach, the symmetry between explanation and prediction would not necessarily 
hold and reality should be sought on the level of mechanisms and powers that cause 
the financial events, not only on the conjunction of financial events, like the data 
generating processes of stock prices”. 
 
Thus, the empirical underpricing of financial risk that paved the way for the current 
economic crisis can be seen as crucially influenced by institutional scenery and actors 
with bounded rationality acting on the structural stage provided by global capitalism. 
They included the role of rating agencies who both determined the risk of 
collateralised debt obligations and advised banks on how to structure them, as well as 
of banks’ strategies to reduce the assets held as buffer against losses (Lawson, 2009: 
768ff). An international regulatory framework for banks that ‘outsourced’ the 
institutional determination of regulating capital to firms’ internal forecasting models 
contributed to increase risks for the general economy overflowing from the financial 
institutions (Rattagi, 2010: 11). This contagion was not weakened by dampening 
negative feedback from the operation of market forces, but was strengthened by actual 
boundedly rational herd behaviour - very different from the processes posited by neo-
classical economics models of individual rational behaviour in orderly markets. 
 
Predicting the crisis requires qualitative analysis of dialectical structural processes of 
global capitalism with a potential for chronic instability – a number of alternative 
structural models exist within broadly defined political economy, including current 
models of co-existing varieties of capitalism (Boyer, 2011, Streeck, 2011). Analysing 
these processes requires identifying agency in collective conceptual categories (acting 
with a group consciousness) that may include national governments, but will involve 
other collectivities, notably, in the current crisis, an analytical category of collective 
behaviour by financial institutions operating at the actual level of critical realist 
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